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In this lecture, I’m going to explain how and why I came to write my article, The Law of
Economic Subordination and Resistance.1 I hope that by doing so, I will be able to
shed some light not only on my own field of labour law, but on the larger problem of
how legal fields or domains of legal knowledge, come into existence, change or
become obsolete, and in the end are either transformed or superseded altogether. I
will be talking about labour law, but I hope you will be thinking about transnational law.
I’m going to try to persuade you that the invention and transformation of these two fields
have something in common. But I’m going to go further. I hope to convince you that
their ultimate fate is determined by some of the very same forces. Transnational law, I
am going to argue, can only survive if it learns from the short, sad history of labour law.
So to begin at the beginning: I am a labour lawyer. For much of my early career, I tried
conscientiously not only to show how the present law fails to produce logical, just and
workable outcomes, but also to propose new legal arrangements that would be in
everyone’s interests. Most of my colleagues were doing the same thing, though of
course we didn’t always agree on either our critique or our proposals for reform. But we
had some good ideas, we tried hard to persuade people to adopt them, and sometimes
we even succeeded. But gradually it became obvious that even our best ideas, even
ideas that judges and legislators adopted and translated into law, did not necessarily
make the world a better place for workers. Nor did the adoption of new international
and constitutional protections for workers. Nor did the election to office of labourfriendly political parties.
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Admittedly, I may have been a slow learner. It took me some time. However, in the
end, I came to accept that law lacks the capacity to fundamentally alter power relations.
Those relations are ultimately determined not by law but by political economy, and they
are found not in the law reports or statute books but embedded in cultural practices and
social structures. No “silver bullet” with “law” written on it, I came to feel, would
fundamentally alter labour markets or relations of employment. Law’s contribution would
be very much at the margins. Workers would only get the rights they were prepared to
struggle for.
Well, they struggled — and they lost. The labour movement is almost everywhere in
retreat. Union membership, power and influence are all declining rapidly — in some
countries, they are near the vanishing point. Labour and social democratic parties are
able to remain “credible” only if they abandon their historic values, alliances and
programs. The welfare state has been fatally weakened by forty years of ascendant
neo-liberalism, and more recently by the force majeure of austerity. Labour market
institutions and regulatory agencies are in disarray — often understaffed and
disempowered. Workers’ share of GDP is diminishing; wages have lagged inflation;
some combination of precarious employment, underemployment and unemployment
afflicts almost all advanced economies. The result, as we all know, is that these
economies are growing more and more unequal, and the problems of economic
subordination are growing more severe.
How can we explain these developments? Globalization, technology and market
fundamentalism are the most obvious causes. However, one more cause occurred to
me, which I explored in an essay entitled Labour Law after Labour?2 I suggested that
labour is no more. It is no longer a sociological descriptor: workers now tend to selfidentify as members of the middle class rather than the working class, as consumers
rather than producers; they mobilize politically around issues of race, religion, national
identity or lifestyle, not the defence of their class interests; and working class culture
has been absorbed into a commercialized, popular culture. Worse yet, labour is no
longer a matter of urgent public concern. So far as I know, hardly any newspaper in
the United Kingdom or North America has a labour specialist. In many jurisdictions,
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labour is no longer a free-standing field of public policy: many governments have
assigned the functions of their labour departments to ministries of welfare or economics;
decisions made by Finance and Trade and Industry departments turn out to be far more
consequential for workers’ wellbeing than anything that happens in whatever ministry
now has formal responsibility for employment standards or collective bargaining. And to
my great distress, Labour is no longer a popular academic subject: in business schools,
courses in labour or industrial relations have given way to courses in human resource
management; in many law schools, labour law is either not taught, taught by
practitioners rather than tenured scholars, or disaggregated into specialist regulatory
fields such as pension law or discrimination law.
And now a question it pains me to ask: What is the future for a legal field called labour
law in which the law is designed to protect people who no longer think of themselves as
“labour” and in which the very concept of “labour” is disappearing from public, political
and academic discourse? And the answer pains me even more: it is not a bright future.
I will return to this theme, the theme of my article Labour Law after Labour, in a
moment. But first I want to point to two great anomalies in the present situation. First,
the disappearance of labour and the decline of labour law’s importance coincide with a
period during which, in many advanced economies, labour has acquired more formal
legal rights than it ever enjoyed before. In my own country, Canada, for example, the
courts have decided that labour’s rights to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike
and picket are all protected by the constitution. And parallel developments have taken
place in the space governed by transnational law where the regulation of labour rights
has expanded enormously.

Now the second anomaly: during this same period, while

labour’s social, economic and political influence have been deteriorating, labour law
scholarship has been flourishing. It has become more theoretically and
methodologically sophisticated and diverse; it has begun to address law at every level
from the indigenous law of the workplace to national systems of labour market
regulation to the domain of transnational labour and social rights; and it has belatedly
begun to explore the problems of previously neglected worker cohorts such as migrant
workers, domestic workers and those engaged in non-waged work. Perhaps these two
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anomalies lend credibility to my thesis that struggle, not law, ultimately defines the rights
that workers actually enjoy.
In any event, I am sure you will understand why I have been feeling recently that my
intellectual life’s savings, almost entirely invested in labour law, are very much at risk.
“How did this happen?”, I asked myself. “Am I the victim of historical trends, rather than
poor personal judgment?” In order to answer this question, I decided to revisit the
history of labour law: when and why did it emerge, when and why did it flourish, when
and why did it decline? Some answers to these questions are found in The Law of
Economic Subordination and Resistance. I will summarize them very quickly.
Labour law began as an academic discipline and field of professional legal practice in
the 1920s — a response to the social upheavals of the late 19th century, to the Great
War and the Russian Revolution and to widespread outbreaks of proletarian discontent.
It took on special urgency during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and really came
into its own during the period between 1945 and 1960 when unions gained power and
legitimacy as part of what is known as the postwar settlement. By about 1960, even
conservative law faculties, law publishers and lawyers’ organizations were prepared to
acknowledge labour law as a legitimate field of legal learning and practice. However, in
the 1970s, the postwar settlement began to unravel. Over the next four decades, as I
have mentioned, globalization, technology, market fundamentalism and the
disappearance of working class identity and solidarity have combined to launch unions
on a long-term downward trajectory from which they may never recover. With the
decline in unions has come a decline in labour’s political and economic power, and that
decline in turn has undermined labour law. After all, who is interested in advocating,
designing, administering, studying or practising a field of law whose output is likely to be
frustration and disappointment?
So, labour law has had a fairly short life, in historical terms, as well as a mostly unhappy
one. But wait! Could things have turned out differently? Better for workers? Better for
society? Better for labour lawyers like me? This is the point in my article at which I
introduce my thought experiment, my historical counter-factual. A counter-factual is
something that might plausibly have happened, but didn’t. Suppose, I conjecture, that
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instead of inventing a legal regime that had only to do with labour, we had created
something more ambitious — a field of law that was concerned not just with
employment but with all forms of economic subordination. As I point out, conceivably
this might have happened during the 1930s, when a wide variety of people — workers,
small businesses, farmers, consumers, investors — were all recognized to be suffering
as a result of a crisis of unregulated capitalism and inept governance. America came
close to responding to their plight by adopting the NIRA, the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1935 —one version of my law of economic subordination and
resistance. Other countries, including Canada, might have followed if the American
experiment had succeeded. But the NIRA was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court;
some parts of it were reintroduced in piecemeal fashion, including what came to be
known as the National Labor Relations Act; and the Great Depression gave way to
preparations for war, the war itself and postwar reconstruction. My counterfactual never
happened.
But could it happen today? Is the crisis of capitalism comparable to that of the 1930s?
And might a new legal field called “the law of economic subordination and resistance”
have something to contribute to the resolution of that crisis? Let’s pursue those
questions and see where they take us.
The last question first. In my article I stress the conceptual incoherence of labour law,
which consists in most common law countries of bits and pieces of private and public
law, of general law and special statutes, which express very different value
assumptions, and use different conceptual vocabularies, but which are deemed to be
core elements of labour law because they happen to address the same phenomenon:
the employment relation. But if that is the criterion for inclusion in the domain of labour
law, why not many other things that seldom find their way onto the labour law curriculum
or the dockets of labour law practitioners: why not trade law and immigration law that
significantly influence the balance of power in the labour market? Why not tax or
corporate law that establish the dynamic of business decisions that in turn lead to the
hiring or firing of thousands of workers? Why not the laws that govern technical training
and retirement security, social housing and health care, that at one remove but with
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great power, help to determine what social goods will be provided by the employer,
what by the state and what by workers themselves?
So, labour law is incoherent. Would the law of economic subordination and resistance
be any less so? The unifying theme of my counterfactual is that gross disparities of
economic power are inherent in capitalism, and that certain generic legal technologies
can and should be used to reduce those disparities or to mitigate their harmful effects.
The aggregation of countervailing power is one such technology; the requirement that
all economic bargains should be fair and transparent is another; state imposition of
minimum or standard terms is another; the displacement of private market provision of
social goods by public provision is another; and the list goes on. My suggestion, then, is
that experts in the technologies of resistance might be able to show tenant groups what
they can learn from labour unions, to show the owners of small business franchises
what they can learn from farmers, and to show mortgagors what they can learn from
consumers. The end point of the exercise is by no means revolutionary. It is merely to
save capitalism from its own excesses, which are very much in evidence today.
If pressed, I would have to admit that the law of economic subordination and resistance
is likely to be no more coherent than labour law. Indeed, by ignoring the very different
social and economic contexts in which subordination and resistance occur, it might turn
out to be even less coherent. Nonetheless, it has both conceptual and practical
attractions.
Conceptual attractions first: The likely incoherence of my imagined law of economic
subordination and resistance is not a mere oversight on my part, an accidental failure
to integrate diverse legal and regulatory systems. Rather, it is deliberately
constructed as the mirror image of our present incoherent legal system which has
been unable to perceive — let alone link, analyze or respond to — many important realworld social, economic and political developments. Although these developments are
clearly related in both their origins and their consequences, they are currently assigned
to separate intellectual domains on the basis of a system of legal and regulatory
taxonomy constructed at another moment in history, and with a different set of value
assumptions.

Thus, the problems of consumers are characterized as “contract law”, of
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tenants as “property law”, of debtors as “insolvency law”, and of workers as “labour law”
or “employment law”. Similarly, the decision-making processes by which their fate is
determined are variously assigned to the domains of “constitutional law” or
“administrative law”, “corporations” or “securities law”.
However, such labels fail to capture the underlying structural pathologies of
contemporary capitalism whose manifestations they represent. By contrast, descriptors
such as those I have proposed — “subordination” and “resistance” — or others such
as “precarity” or “exclusion”, call our attention to what these problems have in common:
they all arise from decades of domestic and transnational market fetishism.
Admittedly, my alternative descriptors — subordination and resistance, precarity and
exclusion — are provocative: but no more so than the terms that have been deployed
to ease us gradually into the post-affluent, post-social democratic era that is our “new
normal”. I have in mind such reassuring terminology as “smart” or “responsive”
regulation, “best practices” and “new public management” which are designed to make
us feel good about deregulation and the retreat of the state from its responsibilities to
protect citizens from malfunctioning markets and malevolent corporations. Or I might
mention “flexibilisation”, “responsibilisation” and “contractualisation”. Such terms are
used to make it appear that recent labour market and welfare “reforms” are not only
inevitable but logical and desirable. Who could possibly be against flexibility, against
responsibility, against freely made contracts? Who indeed — except those who
experience declining living standards and the resulting degradation of their civic and
cultural life. My point, in short, is that conceptual language can render visible or
invisible, controversial or conventional, the developments they purport to describe.
There is also, despite its incoherence, a distinctly practical dimension to a legal field that
answer to the name of the law of economic subordination and resistance. First, it
would be a response to the argument that labour law is nothing more than an attempt to
claim for workers privileges that are unavailable to other groups in society. Why, for
example, should workers enjoy access to special tribunals with expedited procedures
and enhanced remedial powers, when consumer and tenancy disputes must be dealt
with through the slow, clumsy, expensive and often ineffective procedures of the regular
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courts? The answer to such questions is the core notion of the law of economic
subordination and resistance: all subordinate people should enjoy access to similar
means of resistance. Second — a related point — if other groups such as farmers and
small businesses could realistically aspire to the social gains won by workers in the
heyday of collective bargaining and the welfare state, might they not be less hostile to
unions than they now are? And third — perhaps too much to hope for — might not a
broad coalition of social forces emerge from the shared sense of workers and other
subordinate groups that they have a common interest in finding ways to resist their
subordination, or at least to strike a better balance between their interests and those of
powerful corporations?
That’s how legal fields emerge, take hold or decline. Which brings me finally to the
business of this Summer Institute. I’ll try to explain what transnational law has to do
with labour law other than it being another legal field in transition.
One connection is that both fields have been influenced by legal pluralism — by the
notion that the state has no monopoly on the making of law or its implementation. I
developed this notion in Labour Law Without the State,3 one of my first attempts to
describe transnational labour law. In that article, I pointed out that labour law had
never been state-centred; it had always included an important element of informal and
indigenous law making. But as I had to acknowledge in a later article, Landscape and
Memory,4 although labour law was an example of legal pluralism, it was nonetheless
shaped by political economy which profoundly influences power relations in labour
markets and workplaces, as it does in so many other contexts.
My next attempt to describe transnational labour law was in a piece called
Extraterritoriality by Other Means.5 Here I focussed on the practical mechanisms by
which globalization constructs its own normative systems. My sub-title — How Labor
Law Sneaks Across Borders, Conquers Minds and Controls Workplaces Abroad —
pretty much tells the story. And finally, in a recent piece — Making Bricks Without
Straw: The Creation of a Transnational Labour Regime 6 — I try to bring together the
various lines of my work. Is it possible, I ask, that my counter-factual thought experiment
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— the law of economic subordination and resistance — might help us to think of new
ways to protect workers’ interests in the context of globalization?
Globalization has played a leading role in the destruction not only of national labour law
systems but also of other regimes whose ambition is to restore a measure of fairness to
relations characterized by severe inequalities of economic power. We must therefore
learn how to achieve social justice in the workplaces of what looks like being a
permanently globalized world. However, we have been handicapped in pursuing this
project by the absence of a big idea, of a plausible alternative vision of economic
relations. Perhaps, I speculated, maintaining our traditional focus on labour has
contributed to this difficulty. Labour lawyers generally insist that their subject is a
unique, a distinct, legal field. They often make their point by reminding us of the moral
implications of the fact that “labour is not a commodity”. However, as I point out in
Bricks without Straw, this justification for labour law “[valorizes] class membership or
the employment relation” — both of which are concepts with a diminishing grip on
reality. Fortunately, there is another way of looking at labour law. As I suggest:
The … narrative … of employment can be understood as a specific instance of
injustice that reinforces the case for adherence to a general principle: everyone is
entitled to freedom, dignity and a decent life; everyone should be treated with
fairness and compassion. The ultimate value … is social justice, not identity….
In effect, I was offering a new ethical justification for the new legal field that I was
proposing, a field built around all relations of economic subordination and all
technologies of resistance.
Coincidentally, this formulation also opened up a new possibility to expand the spatial
reach of labour law. Today most markets operate across national boundaries and
require some form of transnational regulation. However, while a framework of
transnational law is emerging to regulate capital and commercial markets, the regulation
of labour markets has lagged badly. Worse yet, the absence of effective universal
labour standards has enabled regulatory competition amongst states that are willing to
attract investors by ensuring the subordination of their own workers. If workers’ rights
and interests were to be inscribed along with those of other subordinate groups on a
comprehensive agenda of developmental and trade concerns — rather than as a

10
separate and unique project called “labour law” — they might gain the same
international visibility and transnational support that attaches to, say, environmental or
health or consumer protection issues.
To do this, or course, requires a robust response to the discourse of global “thought
leaders” who seek to “normalize” existing relations of subordination by demonstrating
that they are not only inevitable but morally defensible. I propose two related examples.
According to orthodox economists, Greek pensioners deserve to suffer significant
reductions in their standard of living because they have tolerated a political system
characterized by corruption, tax evasion, and financial irresponsibility. Likewise,
Canadian workers deserve to see their jobs shipped to Mexico or China because
collective bargaining and the tax burdens of the welfare state have led to unsustainably
high labour costs in the manufacturing sector. In this fashion, the discourses of market
fundamentalism and global neo-liberalism legitimate a system of transnational
governance in which the interests of subaltern groups — both labour and non-labour —
receive little attention and less sympathy. Collective challenges to this way of thinking
are a necessary first step towards alternative models of capitalism and of global
governance.
Which brings me — at last — to the prospects of transnational law as an instrument for
social justice. Let us assume, as the literature suggests, that there already exists in
embryo a body of transnational law governing labour and social rights, human rights
more generally and even, as Boa Santos proposes, a jus humanitatis. Let us suppose
as well, contrary to the facts, that the widely-recognized regime of lex mercatoria has
begun to incorporate principles that ensure basic fairness for the subordinate party in
contractual dealings to— debtors, consumers, franchisees and so on. Let us imagine, in
other words, that my counterfactual was instead factual, and that the law of economic
subordination and resistance has already emerged in the interstices of transnational
law. What would that mean?
I have to be careful here. It would not mean nothing. In given circumstances this new
body of law could be used to embarrass corporate wrongdoers, educate public opinion,
and elicit remedial action from governments that now and again want to do the right
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thing. But that’s the problem. Unfortunately the history of labour law tells us under what
“given circumstances” this new branch of law would likely be effective. When labour lost
its power, labour law became a lost cause; and until other economically subordinate
communities regain the power that labour has lost, my thought experiment will not
succeed. There will never be a transnational law of economic subordination and
resistance, to speak plainly, unless and until social movements have the power to do
economic harm to corporations and political harm to governments. International
conventions and covenants, universally recognized social rights, corporate best
practices and codes of conduct, principles of contract and soft law regimes: none of
these will matter much unless people who do not now have power are somehow able to
mobilize effectively and on a broad front.
This will not be easy. The labour movement is clearly disempowered; most other
subordinate groups are unwilling to mobilize or, if they do, to stay mobilized for a
sustained period of time. Further, many such groups mistrust each other; and that
mistrust prevents the formation of broad coalitions. And finally, the complexity of global
markets largely hides corporations and governments from scrutiny and shields them
from pressure. In short, the same circumstances that have led to existing imbalances of
wealth and power across the global economy and in national economies, are also
preventing the emergence of new legal technologies of resistance.
I admit, then, that prospects for rescuing my intellectual investment through a turn to
transnational law seem poor. Why then should we bother with thought experiments like
the law of economic subordination and resistance? Why should we trouble ourselves
about the emergence or non-emergence of a regime of transnational law? One strong
proponent of transnational law answers these questions in the following way. The
conceptualization of transnational law as a new legal field (he says)
… might help both juristic practice and socio-legal scholarship by making it
possible to organize, link and compare what often appear as very disparate and
problematic, but increasingly significant, types of regulation.
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The same might be said for the law of economic subordination and resistance. And then
he makes an even more important claim:
The attempt to clarify the nature of transnational law … forces a fundamental
reconsideration of relationships between the public and the private, between law
and state, and between different sources of law and legal authority. 7
I agree with those claims, and I will add another, yet more compelling, reason why we
should do thought experiments. Their great virtue is that they remind us of the tenuous
connection between legal representations of social relations, and their reality. Concern,
even outrage, about that divergence, I should add, is what has caused the current
explosion of excellent labour law scholarship, as many scholars suggest ways to
rescue, revise or replace existing, obsolete or failed approaches to the field. But alas,
much of that scholarship (mine not least) is unlikely to produce practical real-world
consequences.
Will transnational law suffer the same fate as labour law? Will it come to be regarded as
another thought experiment that was intellectually provocative, but did not achieve its
ambitious objectives of bringing the rule of law and the regime of justice to a globalized
world?
As you will perhaps conclude from your own research and the discussions this week,
the definition of transnational law is contested. For some scholars, it includes all of the
normative regimes that govern relationships or transactions across state boundaries,
including but not limited to those that emanate from state law or from agencies
empowered by treaties or conventions entered into by states. For others, transnational
law is a pluralistic legal system, constructed from the bottom up, by transnational actors
including corporations, sectoral business associations, technical bodies, financial
institutions, agencies for dispute settlement, social movements, trade unions and
communities.8 For others still, transnational law offers, above all, a critical perspective
on the role of legal regulation in a world that is deeply divided economically and
politically. Whatever the definition, one thing is clear: conventional descriptions of law
that begin and end with the state are no longer accurate, if they ever were; in our search
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for greater accuracy we must somehow take account of the multiple normative systems
that now govern the transnational movement of goods, capital, people, culture,
technique, information and ideas. I am going to refer to those systems as “transnational
law” without worrying too much about what is included and what is not in order to make
my final point.
It is this: We can admire the ingenuity and the energy of those who have built
transnational law, whether they set out to do so or not; we can admire the intellectual
acuity of those who have noted its existence and theorized about it in such a stimulating
fashion. But what we cannot do is to romanticize transnational law. Transnational law is
very much like national law, only more so. It shares the strengths of national law, but
also its weaknesses. It is often inaccessible to those who need it most. Like national
law, when it is invoked, it is often ineffective. Like national law, it reflects and frequently
reinforces existing power relations but is far less often successful in revising them.
How then do we establish a just and effective regime of transnational law? Just as we
do with national law: by broad-based political and social mobilization, by winning the
intellectual and cultural battle for people’s hearts and minds, by organizing and
demanding and pressuring for reform of the economic order that the law is meant to
govern. In other words: by making the law of economic subordination and resistance a
global reality.
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